D E C I S I O N

The antecedent facts of the case disclose that the Sangguniang Panlungsod, Davao City, acquired several spare parts for the use of the vehicles of the City Government from various suppliers, totaling P909,646.00, through 116 different transactions, 77 of which amounting to P461,068 were from the Admiral Enterprises. In his Audit Report, the City Auditor noted with emphasis that these purchases were made "not through the City General Services Office, but were done at the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and certified as 'emergency in nature' with personal canvass sheets attached thereto." Following, however, a meticulous scrutiny of said transactions, it was discovered that all these purchases hardly qualify as emergency purchases considering that, in the words of the Auditor, "there was no urgency or imminent and real danger of loss of life or property if the needed supplies or spare parts were not purchased."

So, too, an ocular inspection of the business premises of Admiral Enterprises revealed the significant fact that the same is just a small sari-sari store with no spare parts or supplies displayed that would have qualified it as 'a reputable establishment and bonafide supplier' of the subject supplies, in violation of pertinent rules and regulations relative to said requirement. Dissatisfied with his discoveries, the City Auditor proceeded to make a re-canvass on the items procured to determine the reasonableness of the prices thereof on the basis of comparison between the actual unit cost and the re-canvassed cost plus ten percent (10%) mark-up allowed under COA Circular No. 85-55A, and discovered a price variance ranging from 4.6% to 300% per unit, amounting to P117,222.50. On the strength of the foregoing findings, Notice of Disallowance No. 96-001-101(95) was issued enumerating therein the persons liable to make a refund of the aforementioned price variance among whom was the herein appellant Vice-Mayor, primarily for the fact that he signed and approved the disbursement vouchers.

In his request for exclusion from liability, appellant in a Memorandum addressed to the Director, COA Regional Office No. XI, Davao City, interposes that he (sic) does not rightfully deserve to be included as among those who held liable considering that his participation in the subject transactions was limited to having signed the necessary vouchers after having determined for himself that such vouchers were accompanied by the requisite certifications, e.g. as to the nature of the purchase as "emergency", the fact of actual inspection, delivery and receipt as well as conformity to quality, quantity and price and pertinent attachments like three (3) canvass sheets from different suppliers, and purchase orders as this function is precisely among his duties and obligations as Vice-Mayor. As his culpability is based merely on such approval which he considers as a "matter of formality", he argues that he should not be faulted for such "ministerial duty" citing the Supreme Court ruling in Arias vs. Sandiganbayan for that purpose.

This Commission finds merit in this contention. Following a comprehensive analysis of the facts of this case and the issues involved, as well as a survey of the cited Arias ruling and other related Supreme Court pronouncements on the matter most particularly Magsuci vs. Sandiganbayan (585CAD11) which appears to be on all fours with the instant case, and considering likewise the favorable recommendations of the COA Regional Director and City Auditor concerned, this Commission is of the considered view that the facts of this case, demonstrate beyond cavil that the request prayed for must be granted.

That a "public office is public trust" is one of the fundamental principles in our system of democratic government. Although this basic concept is already deeply rooted in this jurisdiction, still a categorical declaration thereof in the Constitution (Article XI, section 1) is deemed necessary as it will always serve as a reminder to public officers of the sacred character of their tasks. Yet, inspite of this ominous warning, there are frequent occasions which the public has now accepted and perhaps rightly, "as a matter of fact" in government transactions, wherein some, if not most, officials violate this sacred rule. It is admitted that there are (still) those who remain faithful to the principle. It is thus truly unfortunate that an indictment against an entire bureaucracy often results and so many must suffer from the wayward acts of so few. But this circumstance, the Commission will not allow and is ever ready to extend the mantle of protection to those who keep their tasks and positions honorable, like herein appellant Vice-Mayor Bonguyan.

The Supreme Court in that Arias ruling and as reiterated in subsequent pronouncements to the same effect (Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan, 210 SCRA 68; Fernando vs. Sandiganbayan, 212 SCRA 680; Medija, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 218 SCRA 219; Fonacier vs. Sandiganbayan, 57 SCAD 196), while requiring the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made government transactions synonymous with graft, made an equally important caveat that the remedy to this predicament is not to indict and jail every person who may have ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere in its implementation; and that it would be setting a bad precedent if a head of agency is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority. The Court, hence, realizes that it would be asking for the improbable if it is expected that the head of agency will personally do all those details. It likewise realizes that there needs to have some reasonable leeway for heads of offices to rely on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare the bids, purchase supplies, enter into negotiations or issue the necessary certifications. This may have perhaps stemmed from that long-standing principle of presumption of regularity in the conduct of official business upon which public officials have the privilege to place their trust.

In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Vice-Mayor, in affixing his signature to the subject disbursement vouchers which were accompanied by all the requisite attachments and certifications, relied in good faith on those other City Government officials who forwarded to him with the aforecited certifications and attachments, the subject vouchers for his final approval, which significantly is among his functions. For having performed his duty, appellant must not, and cannot be faulted. This, of course, is premised on the basic assumption of absence of conspiracy between appellant Vice-Mayor and those other City Government officers, which in this case, as culled from the herein records, is neither alleged nor proved.

The aforecited Magsuci ruling is in point. In reversing the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction, which was essentially grounded on Magsuci’s having signed the disbursement vouchers and the cheeks for the payment of the supplies involved therein, the Supreme Court noted the absence of conspiracy between Magsuci and the other officials concerned, declaring, and this applies with equal force in this instant case, that conspiracy is not presumed and that the same must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Noting with particularity that the actions taken by Magsuci, and for that matter herein appellant Vice-Mayor Bonguyan, for which he is being charged with conspiracy, involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties, the Court declared:

"There has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might have indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official reports submitted by his subordinate (Engineer Enriquez), but for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts." (Underscoring ours)

This Commission is not oblivious of the ruling in People vs. Rodis (105 Phil. 1294) wherein it was determined that a person maybe so held liable as a co-principal for certain acts of reckless imprudence. When, however, that infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albelt misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing ratiocinations considered, the instant request of Vice-Mayor Bonguyan for exclusion from liability under Notice of Disallowance No. 96-00-101(95) is hereby granted.

(Sgd.) CELSO D. GAÑGAN
Chairman